Abstract. HC-256 is a software-efficient stream cipher. It generates keystream from a 256-bit secret key and a 256-bit initialization vector. The encryption speed of the C implementation of HC-256 is about 1.9 bits per clock cycle (4.2 cycle/byte) on the Intel Pentium 4 processor. A variant of HC-256 is also introduced in this paper.
Introduction
Stream ciphers are used for shared-key encryption. The modern software efficient stream ciphers can run 4-to-5 times faster than block ciphers. However, very few efficient and secure stream ciphers have been published. Even the most widely used stream cipher RC4 [30] has several weaknesses [18, 20, 26, 13, 14, 21, 25] . In the recent NESSIE project all the six stream cipher submissions cannot meet the stringent security requirements [28] . In this paper we aim to design a very simple, secure, software-efficient and freely-available stream cipher.
HC-256 is the stream cipher we proposed in this paper. It consists of two secret tables, each one with 1024 32-bit elements. At each step we update one element of a table with non-linear feedback function. Every 2048 steps all the elements of the two tables are updated. At each step, HC-256 generates one 32-bit output using the 32-bit-to-32-bit mapping similar to that being used in Blowfish [33] . Then the linear masking is applied before the output is generated.
In the design of HC-256, we take into consideration the superscalar feature of modern (and future) microprocessors. Without compromising the security, we try to reduce the dependency between operations. The dependency between the steps is reduced so that three consecutive steps can be computed in parallel. At each step, three parallel additions are used in the feedback function and three additions are used to combine the four table lookup outputs instead of the addition-xor-addition being used in Blowfish (similar idea has been suggested by Schneier and Whiting to use three xors to combine those four terms [34] ).
With the high degree of parallelism, HC-256 runs very efficiently on the modern processor. We implemented HC-256 in C and tested its performance on the Pentium 4 processor. The encryption speed of HC-256 reaches 1.93 bit/cycle. This paper is organized as follows. We introduce HC-256 in Section 2. The security analysis of HC-256 is given in Section 3 and Section 4. Section 5 discusses the implementation and performance of HC-256. A variant of HC-256 is given in Section 6. Section 7 concludes this paper. 
Stream Cipher HC-256
In this section, we describe the stream cipher HC-256. From a 256-bit key and a 256-bit initialization vector, it generates keystream with length up to 2 128 bits.
Operations, variables and functions
The following operations are used in HC-256:
+ : x + y means x + y mod 2 32 , where 0 ≤ x < 2 32 and 0 ≤ y < 2
32
: x y means x − y mod 1024 ⊕ : bit-wise exclusive OR || : concatenation > > : right shift operator. x > > n means x being right shifted n bits. < < : left shift operator. x < < n means x being left shifted n bits. > > > : right rotation operator. x > > > n means ((x > > n)⊕(x < < (32−n)) where 0 ≤ n < 32, 0 ≤ x < 2 32 .
Two tables P and Q are used in HC-256. The key and the initialization vector of HC-256 are denoted as K and IV . We denote the keystream being generated as s. (x) being used in the message schedule of SHA-256 [27] . For g 1 (x) and h 1 (x), the table Q is used as S-box. For g 2 (x) and h 2 (x), the table P is used as S-box.
where x = x 3 ||x 2 ||x 1 ||x 0 , x is a 32-bit word, x 0 , x 1 , x 2 and x 3 are four bytes. x 3 and x 0 denote the most significant byte and the least significant byte of x, respectively.
Initialization process (key and IV setup)
The initialization process of HC-256 consists of expanding the key and initialization vector into P and Q (similar to the message setup in SHA-256) and running the cipher 4096 steps without generating output.
where each K i and IV i denotes a 32-bit number. The key and IV are expanded into an array W i (0 ≤ i ≤ 2559) as:
2. Update the tables P and Q with the array W .
3. Run the cipher (the keystream generation algorithm in Subsection 2.3) 4096 steps without generating output.
The initialization process completes and the cipher is ready to generate keystream.
The keystream generation algorithm
At each step, one element of a table is updated and one 32-bit output is generated. An S-box is used to generate only 1024 outputs, then it is updated in the next 1024 steps. The keystream generation process of HC-256 is given below (" " denotes "−" modulo 1024, s i denotes the output of the i-th step). i = 0; repeat until enough keystream bits are generated.
Encryption and decryption
The keystream is XORed with the message for encryption. The decryption is to XOR the keystream with the ciphertext.
Security Analysis of HC-256
We start with a brief review of the attakcs on stream ciphers. Many stream ciphers are based on the linear feedback shift registers (LFSRs). A number of correlation attacks, such as [35, 36, 23, 15, 24, 5, 19] , have been developed to analyze them. Later, Golić [16] devised the linear cryptanalysis of stream ciphers. That technique could be applied to a wide range of stream ciphers. Recently Coppersmith, Halevi and Jutla [7] developed the distinguishing attacks (the linear attack and low diffusion attack) on stream ciphers with linear masking. And there are algebraic attacks that can be used to break stream ciphers with low algebraic degrees. Recently the improved algebraic attacks (with new techniques to reduce the algebraic degrees) can be applied to break several LFSR-based stream ciphers [1, [8] [9] [10] .
Because the output and feedback functions of HC-256 are highly non-linear, it is impossible to apply the correlation attacks and algebraic attacks to recover the secret key of HC-256. The output function of HC-256 uses the 32-bit-to-32-bit mapping similar to that being used in Blowfish. The past-ten year anlaysis on Blowfish shows that the round function of Blowfish is very strong. Especially there is no attack based on linear cryptanalysis [22] has been developed against the large secret S-box of Blowfish. The large secret S-box of HC-256 is updated during the keystream generation process, so it is almost impossible to develop linear relations linking the input and output bits of the S-box. Vaudenay has found some differential weakness of the randomly generated large S-box [37] . But it is very difficult to launch differential cryptanalysis [3] against HC-256 since it is a synchronous stream cipher for which the keystream generation is independent of the message.
In this section, we will analyze the period of HC-256, the security of the secret key and the security of the initialization process. The randomness of the keystream will be analyzed separately in Section 4.
Period
The 65547-bit state of HC-256 ensures that the period of the keystream is extremely large. But the exact period of HC-256 is difficult to predict. The average period of the keystream is estimated to be about 2 65546 (if we assume that the invertible next-state function of HC-256 is random). The large number of states also eliminates the threat of the time-memory tradeoff attack on stream ciphers [2, 17] .
Security of the secret key
We note that the output function and the feedback function of HC-256 are highly non-linear. The non-linear output function leaks very small amount of partial information at each step. The non-linear feedback function ensures that the secret key could not be recovered from those leaked partial information.
In this subsection, we will first illustrate that even for the HC-256 with no linear masking, it is impossible to recover the secret key faster than exhaustive key search. Then we show that recovering the secret key of HC-256 is more difficult.
HC-256 with no linear masking. For HC-256 with no linear masking, the output at the ith step is generated as
If two outputs generated from the same S-box are equal, then those two inputs to the S-box are equal with large probability. According to the analysis of the randomness of h 1 (x) and h 2 (x) given in Subsection 4.1, we know that for 2048 × α ≤ i < j < 2048×α+1024, the probability that 
) with probability about 2 −31 , the probability that
. It means that each collision leaks about 2 −26.1 -bit information, which is 2 30 times less than that leaked from the collison of the outputs of HC-256 with no linear masking. The information leakage is significantly reduced and it is obvious that the linear masking improves the security tremendously.
Note that the analysis above shows already that the key of HC-256 with no linear masking is secure, so we conclude that the secret key of HC-256 cannot be recovered faster than exhaustive key search.
Security of the initialization process (key/IV setup)
The initialization process of the HC-256 consists of two stages, as given in Subsection 2.2. We expand the key and IV into P and Q. At this stage, every bit of the key/IV affects all the bits of the two tables and any difference in the related keys/IVs results in uncontrollable differences in P and Q. Note that the constants in the expansion function at this stage play significant role in reducing the effect of related keys/IVs (If there is no constants in the expansion function, then set key K B and IV B as 16 consecutive elements in the array W A generated from K A and IV B , the resulting W B and W A would be highly correlated). After the expansion, we run the cipher 4096 steps without generating output so that the P and Q become more random. After the initialization process, we expect that any difference in the keys/IVs would not result in biased keystream.
Randomness of the keystream
We start with the description of a general (and obvious) distinguishing attack that can be applied to any stream cipher. For a stream cipher with n-bit secret key, this attack can succeed with probability 0.98 (with false negative rate and false positive rate 0.02) with 21n × 2 n 2 bits chosen keystream. The attack goes as follows. Assume that the secret key is randomly generated and the initialization vector is not used (or the same initialization vector is used for many secret keys). From each secret key k i , a keystream u i with length 7.6n bits is generated. After generating keystream from about 2.8 × 2 n 2 secret keys, the probability that there is collision in the keystream, i.e. u i = u j for i = j, is about 0.98 due to the collision of the n-bit keys. If the keystream is truly random, then this collision rate is only 0.02. Thus this distinguishing attack can succeed with about 21n×2 n 2 bits chosen keystream.
For any stream cipher with 256-bit secret key, the above general distinguishing attack can succeed with about 2 139.4 bits chosen keystream. Since the key length of HC-256 is 256 bits, we set the security goal as that if the available keystream (generated from the same or different key/IV) is less than 2 128 bits, then it is computationally impossible to distinguish the keystream from random signal.
In this section, we will investigate the randomness of the keystream of HC-256. In Subsection 4.1, we exploit the weaknesses of HC-256 with no linear masking. In Subsection 4.2, we will show that the linear masking eliminates those threats. For the HC-256 with the deliberately weakened feedback function, about 2 174 outputs are needed in the distinguishing attack. In Subsection 4.3, we show that about 2 256 outputs are needed in the distinguishing attack against HC-256.
Keystream of HC-256 with no linear masking
The attacks on HC-256 with no linear masking is to investigate the security weaknesses in the output and feedback functions. We developed two attacks against HC-256 with no linear masking.
Weakness of h 1 (x) and h 2 (x). For HC-256 with no linear masking, the output is generated as
Because there is no difference between the analysis of h 1 (x) and h 2 (x), we use h(x) to refer h 1 (x) and h 2 (x) here. Assume that h(x) is a 32-bit-to-32-bit S-box H(x) with randomly generated secret elements and the inputs to H are randomly generated. Because the elements of the H(x) are randomly generated, the output of H(x) is not uniformly distributed. If a lot of outputs are generated from H(x), some values in the range [0, 2 32 ) never appear and some appear with probability larger than 2 −32 . Then it is straightforward to distinguish the outputs from random signal.
However each H(x) in HC-256 is used to generate only 1024 outputs, then it gets updated. The direct computation of the distribution of the outputs of H(x) from those 1024 outputs cannot be successful. Instead, we consider the collision between the outputs of H(x). The following theorem gives the collision rate of the outputs of H(x).
Theorem 1. Let H be an m-bit-to-n-bit S-box and all those n-bit elements are
randomly generated, where m ≥ n. Let x 1 and x 2 be two m-bit random inputs to
with probability 2 −n . x 1 = x 2 with probability 2 −m and x 1 = x 2 with probability 1 − 2 −m . The probability that H( , and approximating h(x) with randomly generated S-box has negligible effect on the attack.
Remarks. The distinguishing attack above can be slightly improved if we consider the differential attack on Blowfish. Vaudenay [37] has pointed out that the collision in a randomly generated S-box in Blowfish can be applied to distinguish the outputs of Blowfish with reduced round number (8 rounds). The basic idea of Vaudenay's differential attack is that if
, where each a i denotes an 8-bit number. We can detect the collision in the S-box with success rate 0.5 since that S-box Q is used as inputs to h 2 (x) to produce 1024 outputs. If 128 pairs of such five-tuple groups of outputs. Note that the S-box is updated every 1024 steps, 2 119 outputs are needed in the attack.
The two attacks given above show that the HC-256 with no linear masking does not generate secure keystream.
Keystream of HC-256 with the weakened feedback function
With the linear masking being applied, it is no longer possible to exploit those two weaknesses separately and the attacks given above cannot be applied directly. We need to remove the linear masking first. We recall that at the ith step, if (i mod 2048) < 1024, the 
where h 1 (x) and h 1 (x) indicate two different functions since they are related to different S-boxes; z j denotes the P [j 12] at the j-th step. The linear masking is removed successfully in (1). However, it is very difficult to apply (1) directly to distinguish the keystream. To simplify the analysis, we attack a weak version of (1). We replace all the '+' in the feedback function with '⊕' and write (1) as
where
Because of the random nature of h 1 (x) and Q, the right hand side of (2) 
For the left-hand sides of (2) and (3) to be equal, i.e., for the following equation
to hold, we require that (after eliminating the term h 1 (z i ))
For 22 ≤ i mod 2048 < 1013, we note that
where H denotes a random secret 106-bit-to-32-bit S-box, x 1 and x 2 are two 106-bit random inputs, 
184 , the output of the cipher can be distinguished from random signal with success rate 0.9772 (with false negative rate and false positive rate as 0.0228 since the cumulative distribution function gives value 0.9772 at µ + 2σ).
After verifying the validity of 2 184 equations (4), we can successfully distinguish the keystream from random signal. We note that the S-box is updated every 1024 steps, so only about 2 10 equations (4) We note that the attack above can only be applied to HC-256 with all the '+' in the feedback function being replaced with '⊕'. To distinguish the keystream of HC-256, more than 2 174 outputs are needed.
Keystream of HC-256
In this subsection, we investigate the randomness of the keystream of HC-256. We note that there are three '+' operations in the feedback function. We will first investigate the least significant bits in the feedback function since they are not affected by the '+' operations. Denote the i-th least significant bit of a as a i . From (1), we obtain that for 10 ≤ (i mod 2048) < 1023,
In Subsection 4.2, two techniques are used in deducing the randomness of the keystream. One is to eliminate the term h 1 (z i ). Another one is to exploit the relation that those five z i terms are linked by the feedback function. But due to the '+' operations in the feedback function of HC-256, only one technique can now be used. We use the latter technique in the attack because it is about 2 7 times better than the former (The former technique gives probability twice better than the latter, but the relations generated from the former technique is about 2 9 less than that generated from the latter). The attack is as follows. 
For the left-hand side of (7) and (8) (9) to hold, we require that 
where H denotes a random secret 138-bit-to-1-bit S-box, x 1 and x 2 are two 138-bit random inputs, (9), the output of the cipher can be distinguished from random signal with success rate 0.9772 (with false negative rate and false positive rate as 0.0228). Note that only about 2 19 equations (9) can be obtained from every 1024 outputs, this distinguishing attack requires about 2 271 outputs. After exploiting the relation
) mod 1024 (similar to that given in Subsection 4.2), the amount of outputs needed in the distinguishing attack can be reduced to 2 261 . We note that the attack above only deals with the least significant bit in (1) . It may be possible to consider the rest of the 31 bits bit-by-bit. But due to the effect of those three '+' operations in the feedback function, the attack exploiting those 31 bits would not be as effective as that exploiting the least significant bit. Thus more than 2 256 outputs are needed in this distinguishing attack.
It may be possible that the distinguishing attack against HC-256 could be improved in the future. However, it is very unlikely that our security goal could be breached since the security margin is extremely large. We conjecture that any successful distinguishing attack against HC-256 would require more than 2 174 outputs. We thus conclude that it is computationally impossible to distinguish 2 128 bits keystream of HC-256 from random signal.
Implementation and Performance of HC-256
The direct C implementation of the encryption algorithm given in Subsection 2.3 runs at about 0.6 bit/cycle on the Pentium 4 processor. The program size is very small but the speed is only about 1.5 times that of AES [11] . At each step in the direct implementation, we need to compute (i mod 2048), i 3, i 10 and i 1023. And at each step there is a branch decision based on the value of (i mod 2048). These operations affect greatly the encryption speed. The optimization process is to reduce the amount of these operations.
The optimized implementation of HC-256
This subsection describes the optimized C implementation of HC-256 given in Appendix B ("hc256.h"). In the optimized code, loop unrolling is used and only one branch decision is made for every 16 steps. The experiment shows that the branch decision in the optimized code affects the encryption speed by less than one percent. There are several fast implementations of the feedback functions of P and Q. We use the implementation given in Appendix B because it achieves the best consistency on different platforms. The details of that implementation are given below. The feedback function of P is given as
A register X containing 16 elements is introduced for P . If (i mod 2048) < 1024 and i mod 16 = 0, then at the begining of the ith step,
In the 16 steps starting from the ith step, the P and X are updated as
Note that at the ith step, two elements of P A register Y with 16 elements is used in the implementation of the feedback function of Q in the same way as that given above.
To reduce the memory requirement and the program size, the initialization process implemented in Appendix B is not as straightforward as that given in Subsection 2.2. To reduce the memory requirement, we do not implement the array W in the program. Instead we implement the key and IV expansion on P and Q directly. To reduce the program size, we implement the feedback functions of those 4096 steps without involving X and Y .
Performance of HC-256
Encryption Speed. We use the C codes given in Appendix B and C to measure the encryption speed. The processor used in the test is Pentium 4 (2.4 GHz, 8 KB Level 1 data cache, 512 KB Level 2 cache, no hyper-threading). The speed is measured by repeatedly encrypting the same 512-bit buffer for 2 26 times (The buffer is defined as 'static unsigned long DATA [16] ' in Appendix C). The encryption speed is given in Table 1 .
The C implementation of HC-256 is faster than the C implementations of almost all the other stream ciphers. (However different designers may have made different efforts to optimize their codes. And the encryption speed may be measured in different ways. So the speed comparison is not absolutely accurate.) SEAL [31] is a software-efficient cipher and its C implementation runs at the speed of about 1.6 bit/cycle on Pentium III processor. The encryption speed of Scream [6] is about the same as that of SEAL. The C implementation of SNOW2.0 [12] runs at about 1.67 bit/cycle on Pentium 4 processor. TURING [32] runs at about 1.3 bit/cycle on the Pentium III mobile processor. The C implementation of MUGI [38] runs at about 0.45 bit/cycle on the Pentium III processor. The encryption speed of Rabbit [4] is about 2.16 bit/cycle on Pentium III processor, but it is programmed in assembly language inline in C. Remarks. In HC-256, there is dependency between the feedback and output functions since the P [i mod 1024] (or Q [i mod 1024] ) being updated at the ith step is immediately used as linear masking. This dependency reduces the speed of HC-256 by about 3%. We do not remove this dependency from the design of HC-256 for security reason. Our analysis shows that each term being used as linear masking should not have been used in an S-box in the previous steps; otherwise the linear masking could be removed much easier. In our optimized implementation, we do not deal with this dependency because its effect on the encryption speed is very limited on the Pentium 4 processor.
Initialization Process. The key setup of HC-256 requires about 74,000 clock cycles (measured by repeating the setup process 2 16 times on the Pentium 4 processor with Intel C++ compiler 7.1). This amount of computation is more than that required by most of the other stream ciphers (for example, the initialization process of Scream takes 27,500 clock cycles). The reason is that two large S-boxes are used in HC-256. To eliminate the threat of related key/IV attack, the tables should be updated with the key and IV thoroughly and this process requires a lot of computations. So it is undesirable to use HC-256 in the applications where key (or IV) is updated frequently.
HC-250 -A variant of HC-256
In this section, we introduce a variant of HC-256 called HC-256 . For HC-256, each table is updated in the consecutive 1024 steps, and then another table is updated in the next 1024 steps, and so on. For HC-256 , it is different -after one element of a table is updated, one element of another table gets updated immediately, and this process repeats. (The idea in the design of HC-256 is similar to that being used in constructing a variant of RC4, which was proposed recently by Paul and Preneel [29] .) HC-256 is expected to be slightly stronger than HC-256. But the dependency between the consecutive steps has negative effect on the encryption speed of the optimized implementation of HC-256 . According to our implementation, the encryption speed of HC-256 is about 1.68 bit/cycle on the Pentium 4 processor (Microsoft Visual C++ Professional 6.0 compiler + service pack 5). This encryption speed is about 7% slower than that of HC-256 given in Table 1 . The specifications of HC-256 are given below.
From a 256-bit secret key and a 256-bit initialization vector, HC-256 generates keystream with length up to 2 128 bits. The operations, variables and functions are the same as that given in Subsection 2.1.
Initialization process of HC-256
The initialization process of HC-256 consists of expanding the key and initialization vector into P and Q (same as that of HC-256) and running the cipher 4096 steps without generating output. 
3. Run the cipher (the keystream generation algorithm in Subsection 6.2) 4096 steps without generating output.
The keystream generation algorithm of HC-256
At each step, one element of a table is updated and one 32-bit output is generated. The keystream generation process of HC-256 is given below (" " denotes "−" modulo 1024, s i denotes the output of the i-th step).
repeat until enough keystream bits are generated. { j = i mod 1024;
Test vectors of HC-256
Set the key and the initialization vector of HC-256 as 0. The first 512 bits of the keystream are given below 29092e11 5c6fd0fc 79fa96dd 9cc64f73 19ff067b ab844971 91b9fadf fa157303 f3865769 853d86c8 e22a5208 a0b8a50f fadad4dd 225855b2 890c5670 9bb35a6b
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a software-efficient stream cipher HC-256. Our analysis shows that HC-256 is very secure. However, the extensive security analysis of any new cipher requires a lot of efforts from many researchers. We encourage the readers to analyze the security of HC-256.
Finally we explicitly state that HC-256 and HC-256 are not covered by any patent and they are freely available.
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